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That which is common to the greatest number has the least care bestowed
upon it. Every one thinks chiefly of his own, hardly at all of the common
interest; and only when he is himself concerned as an individual. For be-
sides other considerations, everybody is more inclined to neglect the duty
which he expects another to fulfill.
Aristotle, Politics
In the fall of 2005, Admiral Michael G. Mullen, the U.S. Navy’s Chief of NavalOperations, challenged the world’s maritime nations to raise what he called a
“thousand-ship navy” to provide for the security of the maritime domain in the
twenty-first century. Speaking at the Seventeenth International Seapower Sym-
posium at the Naval War College, in Newport, Rhode Island, Admiral Mullen
candidly admitted to the assembled chiefs of navy and their representatives from
seventy-five countries that “the United States Navy cannot, by itself, preserve the
freedom and security of the entire maritime domain. It must count on assistance
from like-minded nations interested in using the sea for lawful purposes and
precluding its use for others that threaten national, regional, or global security.”1
He had voiced the idea a month earlier in an address to students at the College,
but he now elaborated the concept:
Because today’s challenges are global in nature, we must be collective in our response.
We are bound together in our dependence on the seas and in our need for security of
this vast commons. This is a requisite for national security, global stability, and eco-
nomic prosperity.
As navies, we have successfully learned how to leverage the advantages of the sea . . .
advantages such as mobility, access, and sovereignty. . . . We must now leverage these
same advantages of our profession to close seams, reduce vulnerabilities, and ensure
the security of the domain, we collectively, are responsible for. As we combine our
advantages, I envision a 1,000-ship Navy—a fleet-in-being, if you will, made up of
the best capabilities of all freedom-loving navies of the world.2
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Nearly two years after the bold proposal for a multinational maritime force,
little progress seems to have been made in constituting this “navy-in-being.”
This article argues that the thousand-ship navy, now more generally referred to
within the U.S. Navy as the “Global Maritime Network,” or “Partnership,” is
an idea well worth pursuing. But the Navy is struggling (perhaps even failing)
to build support for it, for three reasons. First, it has not invested sufficient
resources—monetary, administrative, or intellectual—to achieve the important
goals articulated. Second, the Navy does not appear to appreciate fully the na-
ture of the challenges it faces in overcoming the global maritime manifestation
of the classic “tragedy of the commons” (which will be discussed below). Third,
despite its rhetoric, the service has not made the thousand-ship navy/Global
Maritime Partnership (TSN/GMP) a part of its current maritime strategy,
which raises doubts as to whether such a concept will be incorporated in the new
strategy currently being written. The absence of any mention of the thousand-
ship navy in Admiral Mullen’s May 2007 testimony before Congress on the sta-
tus and future of the service seems to belie the importance he has given it in forums
involving the international naval community.3 The lack of such official support for
the TSN/GMP has likely been interpreted by nations reluctant to participate as a
sign of weakness in American commitment to the concept.
This article will present its argument in three parts. The first will address the
goals and objectives of the thousand-ship navy/Global Maritime Partnership
that have been communicated in such unofficial venues as the U.S. Naval Insti-
tute Proceedings and Navy Times. The second part will examine the challenges
the U.S. Navy faces in convincing the rest of the world to expend limited re-
sources on an international navy. The third will identify specific steps and initia-
tives that need to be given serious consideration if the potential and goals of the
concept are to be realized. Unless the U.S. Navy is willing to move beyond the
public-relations program that now seems to substitute for serious commitment,
this bold concept risks becoming the maritime equivalent of Woodrow Wilson’s
League of Nations—that is, it will die, and not because it was a bad idea but be-
cause the country that proposed it was not committed to it.
A GLOBAL MARITIME SECURITY NETWORK
The rationale for the TSN has largely been seen within the U.S. Navy as emanat-
ing from increased international maritime traffic due to globalization. In late
2005, Navy officials asserted, “Promoting and maintaining the security of the
global maritime commons is a key element because freedom of the seas is critical
to any nation’s long-term economic well-being. . . . Policing and protecting the
maritime commons against a wide spectrum of threats is a high priority for all
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nations interested in economic prosperity and security that comes from a safe
and free maritime domain.”4
The service has used a series of magazine articles and speeches by various se-
nior officers, including Admiral Mullen, to explain and build support for the
thousand-ship navy. The TSN/GMP is envisioned as an international maritime
force, an aggregation of maritime entities, not just of the world’s navies. It would
also include the world’s coast guards, seaborne shipping enterprises (shipping
lines, port facilities, and other maritime-related entities), and various govern-
mental agencies and nongovernmental bodies. In an effort to head off concerns
about sovereignty, the Navy has attempted to make clear that participation
would be strictly on a voluntary basis and that the goal is simply to meet the
“compelling need” that has emerged “for a global maritime security network, a
‘Navy of Navies,’ to protect the maritime domain and to ensure the lifeblood of
globalization—trade—flows freely and unencumbered.”5 Ten guiding princi-
ples have been established in these public writings and statements for the “Navy
of Navies”:6
• National sovereignty would always be respected.
• Nations, navies, and maritime forces would participate where and when
they have common interests.
• The focus would be solely on security in the maritime domain: ports,
harbors, territorial waters, maritime approaches, the high seas, and
international straits, as well as the numerous exploitable seams between
them.
• While no nation can do everything, all nations could contribute something
of value.
• The TSN/GMP would be a network of international navies, coast guards,
maritime forces, port operators, commercial shippers, and local law
enforcement, all working together.
• Nations or navies having the capacity would be expected to help less capable
ones increase their ability to provide maritime security in their own ports,
harbors, territorial waters, and approaches.
• Nations or navies that need assistance would have to ask for it.
• Each geographic region would develop regional maritime networks.
• To be effective and efficient, the Global Maritime Partnership would have
to share information widely; classified maritime intelligence would be kept
to a minimum.
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• This would be a long-term effort, but the security of the maritime domain
demands that it start now.
To operationalize the concept, the U.S. Navy identified two objectives it con-
siders critical to protecting the world’s waterways and facilitating the free flow of
trade among nations: increased “maritime domain awareness,” through greater
collaboration and transfer of information among nations about anything mari-
time, and positioning of maritime assets so as to be able to respond to crises or
emergencies. The Navy views the TSN/GMP as fundamentally a means of shar-
ing responsibility for maritime security—“importing it into regions where it is
lacking and exporting it from regions that have the capability and desire to do
so.”7 Proponents argue that the concept is already, to some extent, in being; they
regularly point to instances where navies have coordinated operations on an ad
hoc basis to achieve necessary and worthwhile goals. Among the most cited are
Task Force 150, which operates in and around the Saudi Arabian Peninsula; the
Indonesian tsunami-relief effort of late 2004 and 2005; and the Straits of
Malacca counterpiracy agreement, known as MALSINDO, between Malaysia,
Singapore, and Indonesia.
Yet despite such efforts to “sell” the idea of a thousand-ship navy, in late 2006
Admiral Mullen felt obliged to seek active support for it at two international
maritime conferences. At the Mediterranean Regional Seapower Symposium in
Venice and at the Western Pacific Naval Symposium in Pearl Harbor, he told his
contemporaries that it was time to “move beyond dialogue” and to “take tangi-
ble steps” that would “put these powerful ideas to work at sea.”8 He argued three
compelling reasons for moving faster to constitute the Global Maritime Partner-
ship. First, the pace of globalization is raising the stakes for security in the mari-
time domain, where 90 percent of the world’s trade passes from production to
market; second, globalization has brought, along with its benefits, new vulnera-
bilities as well, particularly to “ideologues, pirates, proliferators, criminals, and
terrorists” who not only are likely to target maritime regions but are “innovative,
smart and determined, and [able to] often act—and react—faster than many of
our traditional governing bodies.”9 Third, Admiral Mullen suggested, rapid ad-
vances in technology and information technology can significantly facilitate mul-
tinational naval operations, but only if nations take advantage of them.
Important as these points are, however, perhaps better explicating the way
ahead and accenting the tangible steps the U.S. Navy has already taken to make
the concept a reality would make a stronger argument for it. Also, and though
the Navy has made clear that it has no desire to dictate the terms of participation,
it must provide leadership in the form of action to draw in other navies. Spe-
cifically, the Navy would gain greater purchase among the world’s maritime
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entities by acquiring, employing, and sharing the necessary information and
communications technologies than by merely highlighting the possibilities they
offer. Operations at sea cannot take place without the means to coordinate the
actions of participating units, and they cannot succeed without current and ac-
tionable intelligence. Until the Navy can explain or demonstrate how both func-
tions will be accomplished in the TSN/GMP, it should expect only tepid
responses from potential participants.
Today, on the eve of the Eighteenth International Seapower Symposium, two
years after the thousand-ship navy concept was introduced, it is becoming in-
creasingly apparent that the concept has yet to gain widespread support among
the world’s maritime enterprises. Despite the success of combined naval opera-
tions in highly publicized operations that averted or relieved major human di-
sasters around the world, many countries remain cautious about “joining” or
being seen as advocates of the Global Maritime Partnership. However logical
and benign the thousand-ship navy seems to the United States, other countries
remain openly wary of its intended purposes and possible unintended conse-
quences. They have legitimate concerns, and if the U.S. Navy is to constitute a
thousand-ship navy it must address them forthrightly. That challenge is not in-
consequential. Hyperbole and rhetorical calls to act for the greater good of a
globalizing world will not be sufficient. Indeed, if the logic of the TSN/GMP has
clear appeal to many nations, the concept also has weaknesses that if not re-
solved will likely prove fatal.
“THE TRAGEDY OF THE (MARITIME) COMMONS”
Ruin is the destination toward which all men rush, each pursuing his
own best interest in a society that believes in the freedom of the com-
mons. Freedom in a commons brings ruin to all.
Garret Hardin
The “maritime commons” comprise seas and waterways either beyond sover-
eign control of any nation or under the shared sovereignty of two or more. With
no single guarantor of their security and well-being, they are attractive for illicit
activities. Since September 2001 the U.S. Navy has become particularly con-
cerned about these areas and has called for greater scrutiny over and the “polic-
ing and protecting” of those where the collective economic prosperity of the
world’s trading nations might be threatened.10
As Admiral Mullen has declared, the expansive maritime commons and the
wide range of threats that exist there are beyond the capacity of any navy, includ-
ing that of the United States, to police or control. The nature of those threats,
however, is not self-evident, nor is their urgency commonly acknowledged.
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Among the reasons for this, one of the most important is that the benefits that
accrue from the maritime commons are not equally shared. Where the United
States sees in the maritime common the free flow of commerce, many other
states are forced to live with entirely different circumstances. For major trading
nations like the United States the concern with respect to the maritime com-
mons is a disruption in shipping, which would cause significant perturbations
in the world’s economy. Arguably, however, those effects would be brief and
quickly overcome. The problems that many other nations face in the maritime
commons, however, are not potential but present, not episodic but long term,
and they affect “human” security more than national or economic security.
These challenges include waterborne pandemics, maritime crime and piracy,
the misuse of ocean resources, and the smuggling of contraband goods, people,
and drugs. These challenges are largely regional; they do not threaten the global
village but constitute a menace to the well-being of local populations.
Thus the “tragedy of the maritime commons”—notwithstanding assertions
that everyone benefits from the security of the maritime commons, nations ben-
efit so unequally that many see no reason to contribute to it.11 Many nations that
lie near or astride important parts of the maritime commons but do not benefit
significantly from world trade are hard pressed to justify spending their limited
resources to help the world’s wealthiest countries get richer. The U.S. Navy’s
seeming lack of appreciation for these differing equities may account for much
of its inability to generate enthusiasm.
This raises an important challenge for the combatant commands—building
capacity for partnership through security cooperation. If the Navy is to nurture
an international global maritime network of entities that contribute to the mari-
time domain, it must move past a rhetoric focused on a threat to world trade. It
must find ways to make the thousand-ship navy a solution to a wider set of
problems.
INTERNATIONAL DOUBT AND RETICENCE
Much of the contemporary naval literature refers to providing for or protecting
the “global maritime commons” as if it were a self-evident good. But as we have
seen, the reality is that individuals usually only act when it benefits them di-
rectly. Aristotle, in the passage quoted above, is likely the first to warn against as-
suming too much collective good will as being the natural order of things.12
During the Peloponnesian War, in the fifth century BC, the Athenians made the
point harshly to envoys of the Aegean island of Melos (as reported by
Thucydides): “You know as well as we do that right, as the world goes, is only in
question between equals in power, while the strong do what they can and the
weak suffer what they must.”13
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Neither are the navies of the world equals; the U.S. Navy is, and will likely re-
main for some time to come, completely and absolutely dominant wherever and
whenever it chooses to operate. Admiral Mullen’s predecessor, Admiral Vern
Clark, bluntly stated what most in the service believe, that the U.S. Navy would
and should “operate from the maritime domain anywhere, anytime, without a
permission slip.” While the ramifications of American combat operations in
Iraq and Afghanistan are beyond the scope of this article, it seems apparent that
American willingness to “go it alone” gives many nations reasons for reluctance
to join a potentially encumbering, if ad hoc and voluntary, arrangement like the
Global Maritime Partnership.
ASIAN CONCERNS
India, for example, has been quite candid in its assessment of American interest
in the global maritime domain. A recent article in an influential Indian national
security publication seems to capture a broadly held sentiment about American
intentions.
Among the foremost security concerns of the nation after 9/11 is the use of weapons
of mass destruction by terrorists on its territory and their proliferation through inim-
ical states. The global reach of the predominantly maritime threat and the “overstretch”
of the US Navy have led to the initiation of a series of American initiatives like Prolif-
eration Security Initiative (PSI), Container Security Initiative (CSI) and Regional
Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI), all aimed at mobilizing global support to secure
the US “homeland.”
A “Thousand-ship Navy” (TSN) is another novel concept; recently defined . . . as “a
global maritime partnership that unites maritime forces, port operators, commercial
shippers, and international, governmental and nongovernmental agencies to address
mutual concerns.” . . . The TSN is thus show cased as a benign initiative, aimed at
obtaining the co-operation of “friendly navies.”14
The implication here is that the TSN/GMP is largely an attempt by the United
States to secure its homeland while avoiding the controversial aspects of the pro-
grams listed above and the legitimate concerns they have generated for national
sovereignty. That said, the Indians have also noted, pragmatically, that their na-
tion has much to gain: it would gain access to the U.S. intelligence grid; informa-
tion sharing would neither impinge on India’s sovereignty nor conflict with
international law; and participation would provide India politico-diplomatic
goodwill, since it is unlikely that it will formally join the Proliferation Security
Initiative, at least in the near term.15
Possibly more surprising has been the assessment by Australian and other
Asia-Pacific security analysts that the TSN/GMP is not feasible in Asia because
of differing maritime security strategies, divergent perceptions of the maritime
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threat, and long-standing and unresolved territorial disputes, particularly in the
South China Sea.16 In this view, China is an impediment to the thousand-ship
navy, because of its support of regional maritime projects and agreements that
the United States and its principal Asian ally, Japan, have refused to join.17 No-
where has this been more evident than in the Straits of Malacca, where the
U.S.-sponsored RMSI has drawn heavy criticism from Malaysia, Indonesia, and
even Singapore.18 China, in contrast, has gained extensive diplomatic leverage by
calls for nonintervention by other navies in the straits and by financial support
of local maritime initiatives. Chinese relations with Taiwan impede some navies
from participation in the TSN/GMP. Japan and Korea, however, are strong pro-
ponents of the concept, which adds another complication to its implementation
because it puts them at odds with China.
China’s own strategic calculus and security strategy vis-à-vis the United
States are works in progress. Recently, Jerry M. Hultin, former Under Secretary
of the Navy, and Admiral Dennis Blair, former commander of U.S. Pacific Com-
mand, wrote,
As China’s own naval power grows, it will need to fashion a naval policy within a na-
tional security policy that supports its own interests. It can cooperate with the United
States by coordinating naval strategy and deployments, as do many of America’s cur-
rent allies; it can fashion its own separate strategy, seeking to compete with or dis-
place American strategy, or it can pursue a mixed strategy, combining elements of
both approaches.
For its part, the United States will need to make adjustments in its policies and strate-
gies as Chinese military power grows.19
While the potential exists for the United States to make room for China and
other problematic countries, such as Iran and Venezuela, to join the thousand-
ship navy, mutual distrust will make it difficult to argue that “everybody is wel-
come.” In point of fact, not everyone is welcome, and the criteria that define
“like-minded” interests have yet to be clearly delineated. Yet Russian naval par-
ticipation in NATO’s Operation ACTIVE ENDEAVOUR may provide a model for
how countries with competing national interests can participate constructively
in the TSN/GMP.
The principles and the goals of the thousand-ship navy are nearly synony-
mous with those of the U.S. National Strategy for Maritime Security. The latter is
based on three broad tenets: preserving the freedom of the seas, which includes
the right of innocent and transit passage and access to the world’s ports; facili-
tating and defending the free flow of maritime commerce; and promoting the
movement of desirable goods and people across borders while screening out
dangerous people and goods.20 The similarity in terms and concepts is not lost
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on those who must decide whether to participate in the Global Maritime Part-
nership and then justify their choices to domestic authorities who critically ex-
amine the cost and kinds of operations their naval forces conduct. Unless
compelling reasons can be found that link participation directly to local secu-
rity, few naval forces will be willing to join, even briefly.
CONTENTIOUS OBJECTIVES AND CHRONIC PROBLEMS
As noted earlier, increased maritime security involves two primary objectives:
an effective level of maritime domain awareness must be established, and naval
forces must be in the right places at the right times. Both present considerable
operational and administrative challenges.
The level of maritime domain awareness necessary to disrupt or eliminate il-
licit enterprises requires information and intelligence analysis on a massive scale.
Information is available in many disparate and potentially valuable forms, such as
invoices on maritime cargo, shipping companies, port activity, insurance assess-
ments, fishery area control and management schemes, naval and national intelli-
gence, and countless others. While the TSN/GMP is envisioned as comprising
regional maritime networks, the questions of whom these networks would in-
volve, where they would be, and how they would collect, process, and disseminate
information are all yet to be resolved. Three exemplars are cited as steps in the
right direction: the Virtual Regional Maritime Traffic Center in the Mediterra-
nean, the Malacca Strait Patrol Agreement, and Task Force 150, in the Red Sea and
Strait of Hormuz. These efforts have shown the potential of coordinated maritime
operations, yet they have also made clear the substantial problems that arise when
critical information is classified by a nation. As the U.S.-led counterdrug opera-
tions in the Caribbean have shown conclusively, actionable intelligence is the single
most important prerequisite for interdicting illicit traffic at sea.21
Putting maritime assets in the right location is equally problematic. Most na-
tions do not have the resources to sustain units where they can be most effective.
Often, activity of the kind that the Global Maritime Partnership is intended to
combat occurs in the waters of the world’s poorest nations; their navies find the
distances involved too great, but national sensitivity over sovereignty often pre-
cludes them from asking for help. In this sense national pride is an impediment
to greater cooperation among the world’s navies, even in a framework as flexible,
informal, and ad hoc as the thousand-ship navy. Additionally, the rules of en-
gagement that govern the actions of each navy begin with national rules and reg-
ulations and so may be at odds with the wishes and desires of the United States
and its vision for the TSN/GMP. The experience of U.S. intervention efforts in
the Western Hemisphere provides numerous examples of conflicting national
priorities and perceptions of the issues leading to less than optimal results.22
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Among the critical challenges, then, that confront successful implementation
of the Global Maritime Partnership, four stand out. The first is building trust.
Long-held animosities, suspicions of other nations’ intentions, and the general
secrecy that surrounds national security plans affect relations among some of
the most important potential contributors to the thousand-ship navy. The list is
large—India and Pakistan, China and India, Japan and China, Korea and Japan,
Australia and Asia, Southeast Asia and China, Chile and Argentina, and Vene-
zuela and the United States, to name a few—and the issues complicated and of-
ten intense. The second challenge concerns capability and capacity. Many navies
and coast guards find it difficult to act even when in a position to do so. Most
countries’ navies are more akin to coast guards. Ships and craft suited for cus-
toms and border patrol or for monitoring fisheries and economic exclusion
zones are not well suited to dealing with terrorists or proliferators of weapons of
mass destruction. Likewise, the carrier-centric U.S. Navy is ill suited to opera-
tions in the littorals.
A third issue involves jurisprudence. Domestic and international law govern-
ing conduct on the seas is notoriously vague and complex, which complicates
the actions of forces operating within a construct like the Global Maritime Partner-
ship. Individual navies or commanders willing to act consistently with the intent
of the TSN/GMP may be overruled by sovereign authorities because of the vaga-
ries of the law. Problems of this sort already impede the kind of cooperation en-
visioned by the TSN/GMP, and there would be no mechanism within the
partnership to resolve them. Finally, there is the issue of communications. While
new communications technologies offer many channels, “common operating
pictures” and maritime domain awareness require more than Web portals and
radio circuits. An operational picture at sea is fluid, and a lapse of information
flow for even a few hours can destroy any chance for coordinated or purposeful
action.
Nothing in this list is new, but the world’s navies have yet to find ways to re-
solve them. The Global Maritime Partnership is attractive for that very reason to
many nations that have been frustrated by other attempts and see in the TSN/
GMP at least a promising start. Concrete action and active dialogue, however,
must replace rhetoric and pleas for greater commitment on the part of others. If
the thousand-ship navy is to survive and grow, the U.S. Navy will need to take a
stronger role in constituting a “navy in being,” in a way that does not alarm or
put off potential participants. It must be more a catalyst than a leader.
TIME FOR COMMITMENT
Long a purpose-built “blue water” fleet, the U.S. Navy continues to struggle
mightily to transform itself into a force that can meet the operational challenges
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of littoral waters.23 Moreover, the inability of the Navy, or of its joint and inter-
agency partners, to secure the strategic approaches to the United States against
drug traffickers despite nearly twenty years of intensive effort speaks starkly to
the magnitude of taking on the global maritime commons. Still, the thousand-
ship navy makes sense, and for the reasons Admiral Mullen identified in 2005. But
unless the U.S. Navy shows commitment to the Global Maritime Partnership by
programs and initiatives that directly support it, navies that have not yet signed
on are unlikely to do so any time soon.
The U.S. Navy can and should consider seriously a number of steps in order to
revive enthusiasm for the thousand-ship navy. The first is to make it an impor-
tant element of the forthcoming maritime strategy. Seapower in the twenty-first
century is unique in history. Where once fleet power was determined by the
amalgamation of large numbers of capital ships and their escorts, modern
weapons make such assemblages dangerous and impracticable. In any case, the
world’s nations have demonstrated a growing unease about, if not downright
unwillingness to follow, American-conceived and -led military operations. A
clear and unambiguous statement of commitment to the Global Maritime Partner-
ship in the maritime strategy now being formulated would signal to the world’s
navies that the U.S. Navy is serious about a global approach to protecting the
maritime commons.
Provide clearer guidance about the structure of the TSN/GMP. One of the ad-
vantages of the concept is its ad hoc nature, a “come as you are, when you can”
approach that frees navies from formal agreements or binding obligations. This
is also, unfortunately, one of its greatest weaknesses. Without greater specificity
about operating procedures, command relationships, and basic rules of engage-
ment, navies are hard pressed to explain or justify their commitment to their
national leaderships. There are several rudimentary steps that the U.S. Navy
and committed partners can take to eliminate the less beneficial elements of
“ad-hocracy.” One would be establishing a basic command structure dividing
the maritime commons into defined operating areas and assigning nominal
leadership roles for regional powers. Another would be to delineate a basic set of
rules of engagement addressing obvious and necessary restraints and con-
straints. A third would be linking the TSN/GMP with existing organizations
such as the International Maritime Organization and with the antipiracy centers
being established in various parts of the world.
Third, forget GFS and embrace TSN/GMP-FS. Part of the current Navy strat-
egy is to construct and deploy “Global Fleet Station” (GFS) ships to support the
ships of the U.S. Navy and regional partners in a variety of maritime and littoral
operations. These ships and the operational ideas behind them show how the
Global Maritime Partnership could work and could serve as fleet experiments to
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identify operational and administrative problems and facilitate international
solutions. A group of dedicated TSN/GMP–Fleet Station ships, under the ad-
ministrative control of current U.S. maritime component commanders, could
be deployed to show Navy commitment to the concept and entice other nations
to participate. These platforms could be used as test beds to experiment with
command-and-control procedures using common communications equipment
and operating concepts.
Make the U.S. Coast Guard a major element of the thousand-ship navy. Few na-
vies have, like the U.S. Navy, the sole purpose of warfighting. Most navies, as we
have noted, are more like the Coast Guard, tasked with maritime law enforce-
ment and stewardship of their countries’ maritime resources. Indeed, some ana-
lysts have suggested that we are really speaking of the “thousand-ship coast
guard.” Given the kinds of operations that are likely to occupy the Global Mari-
time Partnership, placing the Coast Guard at or near the vanguard has an indis-
putable logic. If the TSN/GMP is to be a network of all maritime-related
organizations, not just an ad hoc collection of navies, the Coast Guard seems to
be the most logical agent to coordinate it. The Navy, then, needs to find the Coast
Guard a prominent role in the development and growth of the concept and,
relatedly, to consider how the Navy and Coast Guard could operate as a national
force in American territorial waters as well as abroad.
Partners must be enabled to see the same operating picture the U.S. Navy does—
allies and coalition partners have been telling the Navy that for years, and seem-
ingly endless studies of communication, command, and control only confirm it.
Until the U.S. Navy provides a portal through which its partners can tap into its
information, it cannot expect them to contribute freely to it. Until the Navy can
show that it will give as good as it gets, reluctant partners will continue to have a
sound reason to resist meaningful participation.
Finally, if the U.S. Navy is to gain credibility and support for the TSN/GMP, it
must take steps to support and leverage recent efforts by America’s political leader-
ship to ratify the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)
within the next two years.24 American objections have ranged from concerns
about loss of national sovereignty to unease over access to important but often
contentious seaways. The unwillingness of the United States to sign an agree-
ment that almost all of the rest of the world has ratified makes advocacy for the
TSN/GMP appear hypocritical. UNCLOS is not a perfect document, but such
agreements rarely are, and America already purports to abide by its rules; formal
ratification should be painless, and it would constitute a major step toward pro-
tecting the global maritime commons. The nation must demonstrate that it
honors Admiral Mullen’s statement that “acting in one’s national interest” serves
the global interest as well.25
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The thousand-ship navy is a concept whose time has come. The U.S. Navy
can no longer protect the world’s most important waterways alone. Still, the
Navy’s conception of the maritime commons as being a self-evident good
must be modified both in word and in deed. Naval strategies and concepts do
not stand in isolation from the particular issues and interests that dictate na-
tional security policies. Hence, the U.S. Navy must make clear its firm commit-
ment to, and the benign intent of, the thousand-ship navy through concrete
acts. The alternative is to lose the opportunity for an innovative and workable
solution to an age-old problem—protecting the freedom of the seas in a time
of great uncertainty and peril.
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